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Nathan Glazer is Professor Emeritus of Education and Social Structure at Harvard Uni­
versity and co-edithor of "The Public Interest". Bom in New York, he got a Ph.D. in sociology 
from Columbia University (1962), and started teaching at Berkeley in 1963, later to become 
affiliated with Harvard University. As he briefly stated, his lifelong interests "have been ethnic 
issues and social policy".
His Presidential appointments include the Task Force on Urban Affairs (1964 and 1972) 
and Education (1980). He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, serving 
as its Secretary from 1980 to 1982. Aside from the bestseller "The Lonely Crowd" (1950; co-au- 
thored with D.Riesman and R.Denney), among his books are "American Judaism" (1957), "The 
Social Basis of American Communism" (1961), "Cities in Trouble (1970; editor), "Beyond the 
Melting Pot" (1963; co-authored with D.PMoynihan), "Cities in Trouble" (1970; editor), "Remem­
bering the Answers: Essays on the American Student Revolt" (1970), "Affirmative Discrimination: 
Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy" (1975), "Ethnicity: Theory and Experience" (1975; co-edited 
with D.PMoynihan), "The Urban Predicament" (1976; co-edited with W.Gorham), Ethnic Di­
lemmas: 1964-1982" (1983), "Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy” (1983; co- edited with 
K.Young), "The Public Interest on Crime and Punishment" (1984; editor), "The Public Interest 
on Education" (1984; editor), "The Public Face of Architecture (1987; co-edited with M.Lilia), 
"The Limits of Social Policy" (1988), and "The New Immigration: A Challenge to American 
Society" (1988).
This interview took place in Salzburg, on July 7, where Professor Glazer was a Faculty 
member of Salzburg Seminar on "Religion, Ethnicity, and Self-Identity". The interviewer would 
like to thank Mrs Glazer for her kind assistance.
* * *
- After witnessing recent resurgence of ethnic conflicts and violence in the last two decades, 
how valid do you see the old "diffusion" (or "developmental") theory that claimed negative cor­
relation between the level of modernization and the intensity of ethnic affiliation.
Nathan Glazer - Well, I think it’s a perfectly sound theory. I mean sound in the sense 
of an interesting generalization. My view is that most generalizations in sociology, particularly 
those that take a correlative character, are at this stage of development of sociology, and 
maybe forever, too simple. I mean, if you break down the two categories that we’re compa­
ring: modernization and ethnic conflict, I think you can find cases where that works fine. 
For example, take Western Europe where there is no question that the intensity of ethnic 
conflict has been reduced, conflicts between Scandinavian societies, between Germany and 
France, France and England, etc. There might be many other factors that explain it, but I 
think one factor is a degree of economic development which normally means better economic 
conditions for most, but also means high level of education which tends - at least in the 
Western world - to break down prejudices and stereotypes. But there are always other factors 
involved, so it will not hold universally. I mean, would it be the case that the spread of 
modernization in Malaysia will reduce conflicts between the Malays, Chinese and Indians?
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Possibly not because there might be other factors, the increasing strength of fundamentalism 
among Muslim groups, for example. You have to take into account other factors. I would 
say one important element in the decline of ethnic conflict in Western Europe is a rise of 
a kind of rational cynicism in which nothing is taken deadly seriously - whether it’s patriotism 
or religion.
- But, I guess, you would not say that this sort of correlation can be found only in the 
Western world?
Nathan Glazer - No, it is certainly presented as the more general. I only suggest that 
there are different categories under modernization and different categories under ethnic 
conflict. For example, some years ago people used to talk about the rise of movements of 
provincial autonomy in Western Europe: Scotland, the Bretons, the Catalonians... They rep­
resent different kind of modernization, and we have different kind of ethnic conflict in result. 
It was more contained within the national state, more manageable, it simply involved a 
certain degree of political moderation to manage it; it gave autonomous rights like in the 
districts of Spain and it solved the problem all the way. But, then, look at the Basques. Why 
the Basques are sort of violent I do not know. The generalization is a good one, but one 
has to break down both elements (i.e. modernization and ethnicity) as being too overbroad 
to really hold up.
- In the late 19th. and early 20th. century, modernism implied a uniform, one-dimensional 
("progressive'') national identity which is now, if we replace "'progressive" with ''traditional'', and 
"national" with "religious", the pattern of fundamentalism. Can it be said that the process of 
postmodenization is creating a different type of identity: a multifaceted and multidimensional 
one? If so, are those "multiple identities" (and the "explosion of identities", to use your term) - 
as in the case of an African-American-feminist-homosexual-urban professional - actually preven­
ting ethnic friction by enabling us to deal more flexibly (shifting from one identity to the other) 
with the everyday reality. Or are they rather dangerous in the sense that they pose a threat to 
social cohesion and the common fabric of society that represents the basis of social solidarity?
Nathan Glazer -1 mentioned in the response to the earlier question the rise of a kind 
of rational cynicism about one’s nation. Now, I think when you look at national cohesion a 
great deal depends - in terms of fears about national cohesion (fears about disloyalty) - on 
the degree to which there is a total commitment to the nation. In the 1950s, with the cold 
war against communism, senator McCarthy accused many Americans of treason and there 
was a tremendous amount of conflict in the society. It was not ethnic conflict, it was really 
the question of political loyalties but many feared certain groups would be more affected 
than others. Now, attitudes in the United States or France, or England are different. You 
take the case of England, the attitude towards the great expedition, which was very expensive, 
to the Falklands. On the whole the British supported it, and a sense of patriotism was still 
involved. But you also have people who said "look at the costs, it wasn’t worth saving these 
1200 sheep farms". So I do think there is a decline in monolithism that means we can 
accommodate - with less danger, I think - the explosions of identities. We are not so fast 
any more to attribute treason as we were in 50s. I do think you’re right: many of these 
identities are crosscutting and that helps. There are black lesbians and whether they are 
more concerned about lesbian/gay rights or black rights might vary from situation to situation. 
It is true that there are people who have written novels about wars between men and women 
or the rise of the Amazons, but women are so related to men that they can never quite 
exercise the separatist role that ethnic group can.
In the context of cross-cutting idenitities, I was thinking of the discussion concerning 
the Balkans this morning. There is no question that one of the problems of the Balkans, 
and I was going to raise the question about some other countries, is the way religion and 
nation coincide. You take the border between Poland and Ukraine, with Catholics on the
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one side and Eastern Orthodox on the other, or the situations with eastern Hungarians and 
Rumanians - Rumanians who are Eastern Orthodox versus Hungarian who are Calvinists. 
In the case of Bosnia more and more have religion and ethnicity become a dangerous mix. 
Now, when I think of provincial upsurges in Europe there is always something which restrains 
it. The Bretons are Catholic too, or the Scots also speak English - so you have those strong 
coinciding lines of language, culture, religion. If you think about the situation becoming 
more moderate in Western Europe, you might well say that this is a factor as well as the 
increased wealth. So I think you’re right, I think that the explosion of identities also cuts 
down certain identities. One of the Salzburg Fellows was saying in this seminar: "sometimes 
my identity changes depending on the situation". When he is abroad he is very American, 
when he is with a group of Americans he is very Japanese American, when he is in a group 
of writers he is a writer... So, identity is selected according to the social situation: the Ame­
rican, the Japanese, the writer or the male. Though I think there are certain identities that 
are more basic. There is a definition by C. Geertz or R. Emerson of ethnicity as the identity 
which, when the chips are down, is the most basic. Well, I do not know if when the chips 
are down blackness, let’s say, is the most basic. Probably it is more basic than American, 
but for a lot of other groups I don’t think the ethnic identity would become the most basic.
- What is your opinion of the Rational Choice approach to ethnicity claiming that ethnicity 
is either a "corporate" possibility for the individuals to maximise benefits which can not be ma­
ximized via individual action, or simply a sociocultural constraint on the individual rationality 
that makes collective action less vulnerable to free riding.
Nathan Glazer - That is a good question. Choice is important, especially the choice of 
ethnicity. There was a reference, I think maybe on this morning’s lecture, to the people in 
Poland who claim German origin. Now, that’s a very rational choice. Nobody spoke German 
but they knew life was better in Germany - even if you’re on unemployment insurance - in 
Germany you would be better off than in Poland. So everyone is surprised how many "Ger­
mans" there are in Poland. Now, that’s at one crude basis, one crude example of a purely 
or a mostly rational choice. I have, oddly enough, someone related to me who is half Jewish 
and half American Indian. He knew he was American Indian, but he ignored his real father. 
But over time he began to identify himself: he was an artist, more and more an American 
Indian artist. He began to take up themes from the American Indian nativist tradition. He 
is now one of the leading American Indian artists of the United States. He is 50% Mohawk, 
and he is a member of tribe. So I have seen a shift from rational choice to a kind of more 
basic commitment. You can go from rational choice to basic commitment in sense of the 
choice - whatever reason you undertake it engages you, or involves you, or connects you 
and becomes your life. Certainly, rational choice plays a role.
In the United States there are many examples of people who have two second names. 
There is a case of a well known married Hispanic woman. She uses her family name exclu­
sively because there is a degree of affirmative action for Hispanics. Or take the case of 
African Americans. They have no choice because the American pattern of race consciousness 
makes every partial black a whole black. In Jewish gentile marriages there are choices that 
mean very different things. In these days they are not so much rational choices but rather 
sentimental choices because there is very little loss, if any, in being Jewish in today’s America. 
One time those choices were much more rational.
When we talk of African Americans we talk of a group that has no choice. It does have 
the choice of passing if the complexion is fair enough, and just not black anymore. In other 
cases there are choices, because of the great amount of intermarriage, so you can choose 
your identity. While choosing you certainly have rational factors influencing you in different 
ways. Still, I think one should not overly emphasize the rational factor. There is such a thing 
as a primordial movement. Let me give you an example. There is a big movement in the
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United States, and maybe in other places, for adopted children to find their parents. People 
write books about it, they set up movements, there is a lot of discussion going on: is it good 
to do it?, is it bad to do it?, and so on. Well, I do not think it is a rational choice. I do not 
think they think: "If I find my birth parents I’ll be richer". It is quite the other way around; 
the birth parent is generally of a lower social status than the parent who adopted. This is 
more of a kind of intimate priority - to be able to answer "Who am I?", with this notion 
that genetic inheritance tells you something about yourself, something you want to know. In 
conclusion, I think the rational choice elements are strong - we see them operating, we see 
them operating crudely, we see them operating in a more sophisticated way - but the pri­
mordial element one should not ignore.
- In recent lectures you argued that there is a specific ethnic pattern in the US. Aside from 
the almost religious (in Durkemian sense) power of the Constitution you have mentioned, do 
you see other",safety mechanisms'' incorporated in the pattern? Will they be capable of preventing 
ethnic frictions? Having in mind current demographic trends in the US which will make minorities 
the majority, this seems to be of great importance.
Nathan Glazer - Well, I think there are other safety factors. One of them that might 
be related to the Constitution is the significance of legal mechanisms and the respect given 
to them by saying: "Resort to the law!". I will give you an example, which I must say, impresses 
me. I have been studying the case of two professors at City College, New York (the college 
I went to) both of whom have become terribly controversial, all on this multicultural sort of 
side. One of them is Jewish, and he argued the intellectual inferiority of Blacks. OK, that 
is a very dangerous thing to argue, but he has written articles, has a whole book - but not 
a publisher yet (and I do not think anybody wants to publish it). He had a lot of troubles 
at City College. His classes have been disrupted, he was denounced at the State by the 
Faculty Council, and a committee has been formed to investigate his "inadequate" teaching. 
Since he was giving an introductory course in Philosophy, the administration set up another 
course for the students who did not want to take his course. He sued in Federal Court, on 
the grounds of the 1st Amendment, that he was being punished because of his free speech. 
So there was a trial in New York, and the decision said: "His rights of free speech were 
abridged, you cannot investigate what he does, you cannot set up another classroom, and 
you must try your hardest to prevent his classes of being disrupted." So, there he is teaching 
away, and it seems that the trial (the decision is now three years old) has settled the whole 
thing. Now, why has this decision settled it? One can be just as angry at him now as then. 
One can say: "This College is 35% Black, and he is saying we are inferior. We are not going 
to give up, we are going to throw rocks at him, we are going drive him out of campus."
What I am saying is that the acceptance of law is a powerful phenomenon. And this 
is not an institutionalized factor, it is just something that has grown up over the years - with 
many conflicts where laws were not observed. Take the "Scott decision" saying that all the 
arrangements Congress made on slavery were relevant because you could not limit slavery 
to one part of United States. That is why Lincoln was elected, and that is why the South 
seceded: and then you had a war, more or less. What I am saying is that this is a very strong 
mechanism, a legal mechanism, in which we go to the law for almost anything, and that is 
a real restraint.
Then, I think, there is another point we have not talked about much, either in the 
sessions or working groups. I believe there is such a thing as political intelligence. I would 
not call it a wisdom, maybe a kind of cunning, if you will, or a kind of common sense that 
says: "If we do that it is going to be terrible, and if we do not do that it will be better." Now, 
I am not saying that the United States have always exhibited it, but because it is a mixed 
country, because it begins with one kind of diversity - a religious one (we have, for example, 
no state churches) - the state and church will not mix. There is a lot of prejudice, but there
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are moments of political intelligence in decision-making - such as that the percentage of 
Black representatives should equal the percentage of Blacks in the nation. And the kind of 
arrangements that say: "We can not exclude other Americans just because they look different"
- are more or less accepted.
Many Americans are absolutists in various ways, but the elite level tends to be (though 
not always) withdrawn from absolutism. I can think of few cases of unnecessary absolutism 
over the years. In many ways the Cold War was absoluticized - at enormous cost - and it 
caused a lot of trouble. I am saying this on the basis of reading some histories which suggest 
that even Reagan, in the early days of his administration, was involved in correspondence 
with Russian leaders. He said: "If I talk to them we can all make a deal." The Soviet Union 
was already in trouble so they could have made the deal, but his advisers, his intelligent, 
sophisticated advisers said: "No, you can not give in an inch!", and they would prevent him 
from writing letters.
So, I think, there is an overall tendency to avoid absolutism. Not throughout the society, 
but certainly on the elite level. This is a kind of safeguard. One of the problems with that 
is: will we have that kind of political intelligence among minorities when they become ma­
jorities? Some of it we can already see at work in some of the cities, where we have Black 
majority and Black Mayors. On the whole, the role of the Black majors is quite good. First 
of all, there is almost nowhere where they are not dependent on White votes. Secondly, they 
are also dependent on White-run States, because States provide money. So, on the whole,
I do not see this absolutization occurring anywhere, and that is - you might say - a kind of 
the pattern of long time democracy, deals, and arguments. Anyhow, I am the optimist on 
that score... maybe I should not be.
- You wrote a well known book on affirmative action. If one just glances at its cover page, 
your title ("Affirmative Discrimination") clearly suggest your disenchantment with the policy. You 
write that your own position in viewing affirmative action is a pragmatic one. You are very much 
against the eradication of the policy, but at the same time you are advocating some substantial 
changes. How would those changes, if made, reflect on the problem of multiculturalism which 
largely draws its self-consciousness from the affirmative action implementation?
Nathan Glazer - That is a complicated story. Obviously, I was against affirmative action 
in employment and college education and so on, and I argued that we have to operate on 
individual basis; to get rights on the basis of group affiliation is a very bad thing for America. 
Nevertheless it was done. At the time I argued against it: one never knew what the end of 
policy would be, how far would it go. There is the Lebanese example - the whole country 
gets cut up. For various principled reasons it got to be a very messy program, and it operates 
administratively because Congress just does not want to touch it. Again, that is the avoidness 
of absolutism. The debates would go on forever so they prefer not to talk about it: "Let the 
executives run it, and the Courts interpret it, but the Congress stays out."
It is not the worst system, but it contains a lot of nonsense, crazy things like when 
Asian American immigrants get preference in bidding for government contracts over native 
Americans just because they are Chinese or Japanese or Asian Indian and the other person 
is just a white American. Anyway, by now the policy is so institutionalized, every business 
has a affirmative action office, every College or University has an affirmative action officer, 
that if you knocked it out (and you could in theory) you would throw thousands of affirmative 
action officers out of work. And they are all Black so you should not do it. So it is an 
accommodation.
In principle I would like to see an end point, an indication of where is this supposed 
to end and an indication of who is out and who is in. But I think we are going to have to 
depend on Courts to interpret it. And I think they will. When it comes to Asian Americans 
they might say: "These laws are no longer necessary." If you take admissions to Colleges,
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the Colleges definitely changed the policy by 1983 so there was drop off in Asian Americans’ 
admission. Then the Asian Americans howled, and they now get admitted not on any af­
firmative action grounds but on quality grounds.
Finally, I am pragmatic in this sense. For 12 years we had a Republican administration. 
We had 8 years of Reagan and 4 years of Bush. They specifically ran for Office saying they 
were against affirmative action and that they would change it. They did not change it for a 
jot. They tried it but there was such a storm that they gave up. If a committed ideologue 
like Reagan could not change it, no one can change it. Drop it, leave it to history and see 
what happens.
- In 1975, your book "Ethnicity: Theory and Experience" presented what was then the state 
of art in ethnic studies. Since that time we have been witnessing a steady growth of scholarly 
interest in the matters of ethnicity. In your opinion, what kind of future research agenda do we 
need? Should we concentrate on the more elaborate descriptions of local ethnic situations throu­
ghout the world, or on the more general, theoretical modeling?
Nathan Glazer - First of all, on the empirical side, you do not even have to give anyone 
any orders. Just listening to my working group I was amazed with all these problems people 
study. Then, they have to study them because they are usually their own problems, and they 
bother their own people. So they just go on studying them and there is no way of avoiding 
it. On the theory side, I think we have to build up little elements of theory. I suppose it 
goes back to Robert K Merton’s middle range theories. For example, I think that the most 
impressive book - though I have not read all the books on ethnicity, there are so many of 
them - or one of the most impressing books trying to develop a theory or a partial theory 
is Donald Horowitz’s "Ethnic groups in conflict" (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1985). He does not take all ethnic conflicts, he takes developing world conflicts, and he 
studies them in some detail and comes up with some interesting things. I mean, I find them 
interesting. The key issue for him is when you are a minority and you know the polity is 
ethnicized, what reassures you that you are not going to loose everything?" Or what can 
reassure you that you will not loose everything? Well, that is the situation in so many other 
parts of the world.
I think we need building blocks of theory, and in that respect we were probably pre­
mature in the "Theory and Experience". We divided the empirical cases into three groups. 
We dealt with the Western world, we dealt with the developing world, and we dealt with 
what we called "the old Empires" (including Soviet Union, India and China), but we did not 
really write an introduction to say that there is one governing principle for each of these 
categories. Maybe we need more categories today, particularly in regards to Eastern Europe. 
We need another category to accommodate a different kind of history: the history of old 
nations, but nations which did not go through quite such a long period of establishing their 
reigns. So I think we have to develop partial theories. I opt for theorizing, but I think theories 
can not be universal.
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